The holy grail of attacks against E2EE systems is called exfiltration where the sensitive data, namely the private keys or plaintext messages, are stolen from the endpoint. onion connections only (staying within the Tor network) - advanced adversaries are capable of compromising the trusted computing base (TCB) of nearly all platforms: Īll proper end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging systems store private key(s) exclusively on user's device (endpoint). High-risk users should also bear in mind that even in the event that strong and secure end-to-end encryption is used - for example encrypted chat using. While encryption to the server prevents exit relay eavesdropping, it still leaves one problem unresolved: server logging. Tails has noted that without encryption, Tor exit relays can see the contact list, all messages, file transfers, and audio/video. Depending on the protocol which an instant messenger is using, encryption might be disabled by default or not even supported. Tor exit relays can eavesdrop on communications if encryption to the server is disabled.
For a comprehensive comparison of instant messengers, see here. It is recommended to review the Do not Mix Anonymity Modes section in conjunction with this entry. See Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto). It is estimated that within 10 to 15 years, Quantum Computers will break today's common asymmetric public-key cryptography algorithms used for web encryption (https), e-mail encryption (GnuPG.), SSH and other purposes.
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